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Abstract
Since the expulsion of more than ten million ethnic Germans
from Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Second
World War, the political and cultural organizations of the
expellees have advocated the interests of this segment of the
Federal Republic’s population. The article examines the vari-
ous ways in which activists in the expellee organizations have
used the ambiguity of homeland and belonging in the politi-
cal process in Germany and increasingly in Europe to further
a political agenda that, while it has undergone major
changes, remains deeply problematic in some of its objectives
and many of its implications.
Résumé
Depuis l’expulsion de plus de 10 millions de personnes d’eth-
nie allemande d’Europe Centrale et d’Europe de l’Est après
la fin de la deuxième Guerre mondiale, les organisations
politiques et culturelles des expulsés ont milité en faveur de
cette section de la population de la République Fédérale.
L’article examine comment les activistes appartenant aux
organisations des expulsés ont profité de l’ambiguïté en-
tourant les concepts de patrie et d’appartenance dans le
cadre des processus politiques en Allemagne et, de plus en
plus, dans le reste de l’Europe, pour faire avancer un agenda
politique qui, même s’il a connu des changements majeurs,
reste toujours extrêmement problématique par rapport à cer-
tains de ses objectifs et plusieurs de ses implications.
Introduction
B
etween 1945 and 1950, one of the largest forced
migrations in European history took place: as a
consequence of the Second World War almost
fourteen million ethnic Germans fled or were expelled
from their traditional homelands in Central and Eastern
Europe.1 Of the survivors, approximately two-thirds were
resettled in the American and British zones of occupa-
tion, and one-third in the Soviet zone. Thus, the popula-
tion of the newly established Federal Republic of
Germany comprised around one-sixth of people whose
geographic and cultural background, although not ho-
mogeneous in itself, was significantly different from that
of their new environment, and who had recently experi-
enced uprooting and expulsion from their homeland.2
Therefore, and because of their large numbers and wide-
spread distribution across occupied Germany, the ex-
pellees were visible victims themselves, but their very
presence also increased the self-perception of victimhood
among the indigenous population who were required to
share with them what little was available in terms of food
and shelter. The belonging of the expellees to the re-
emerging German polity was therefore not uncontested
in the beginning, precisely because the expellees them-
selves as well as the indigenous population did not per-
ceive those parts of Germany to which the expellees had
come to be their homeland. Thus, the sense of victim-
hood among the expellees differed in another crucial
respect from that of the rest of the German population:
the  loss of their homeland. This dimension has sub-
sequently provided an additional impetus for a collective

identity to be formed among refugees and expellees from very
diverse countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
The resultant politics of homeland also became a politics of
belonging rooted in a certain sense of (deliberate) ambiguity
of what and where the expellees’ homeland was, and how and
where they belonged. This ambiguity has proven to be a salient
factor and can explain why, despite the fact that the integration
of the expellees was more or less completed by the late 1950s,
a so-called expellee identity remained a political factor to be
reckoned with—particularly in relation to the reconciliation
process between Germany and its neighbours in Central and
Eastern Europe, well into the twenty-first century.
In the following, I will examine the various ways in which
activists in the expellee organisations have used the ambiguity
of homeland and belonging in the political process in Ger-
many and increasingly in Europe to further a political agenda
that, while it has undergone major changes, remains deeply
problematic in some of its objectives and many of its implica-
tions.
After a brief theoretical exploration of the concepts of
homeland and belonging in the context of forced migrations,
I proceed chronologically in my analysis of the policies of the
expellee organizations over the past half-century, paying par-
ticular attention to the domestic political process in Germany
and to the country’s relationship with Poland and the Czech
Republic. I conclude with some general observations on the
likely future significance of homeland and belonging.
Conceptualizing Belonging
That “identity and belonging are . . . potentially divisive” is an
observation made by Anthony Giddens in his seminal work The
Third Way.3 This divisiveness is a result of another, and equally
fundamental, function of identity and belonging, namely to
express bonds between certain people but not others. Further-
more, there is also a relationship between identity and belong-
ing: without identity, there is no belonging. In this way,
identity, both as a self- and other-assigned category, determines
where people belong, or to use a phrase coined by Ignatieff
“belonging ... means being recognised and being understood.”4
This fundamental socio-psychological need for recognition
and understanding is all the more important in circumstances
of forced migration because the sense of belonging, not just to
a particular community, but also to a specific place, is brutally
disrupted, and the reason for this disruption is often located by
the perpetrators of forced migration in the particular commu-
nity’s ethnic or national identity. It is the very purpose of forced
migrations to destroy the physical connection of community
and place. As such, forced migration is the result of the struggle
between two mutually exclusive conceptions of belonging:
those who are perceived not to belong to the (territorially)
defined community are expelled, regardless of whether they feel
they belong to the contested piece of land as much as it
belongs to them. Since for most communities place is a
crucial component of their identity, the loss of spatial
attachment makes their identity incomplete. Until a new
place can fill this gap, i.e., become a new source of iden-
tification, there will always be some longing for return to
the homeland, for its repossession by the community
forced from it.
The often problematic implication of this is perhaps
best described as “the extreme ambiguity of place as a
political guide.”5 A lost homeland is a powerful source
of political mobilization and action, and the assertion of
a right to this homeland can manifest itself in policy
agendas of reconquest, return, and the preservation of
the homeland’s “ethnic” characteristics. Even if claims
to the lost homeland are merely “theoretical,” because
there is no real opportunity ever to realize them, they
play an essential role in the preservation of the commu-
nity’s identity and thus of the community as a distinct
collective. Especially in relation to ethnically motivated
forced migrations, the preservation of an identity that
can continue to hold an expelled community together is
crucially related to territory. No political entrepreneur
that depends on the existence of an ethnically/nationally
defined community will be able to “instil in people a
sense of kinship and brotherhood without attaching
them to a place that they feel is theirs, a homeland that
is theirs by right of history.”6 In turn, then, the preserva-
tion of this bond to “the historic land, the land of past
generations, the land that saw the flowering of the na-
tion’s genius”7 is the key condition for the continued
existence of his/her specific constituency, and it is there-
fore in the political entrepreneur’s foremost interest to
keep the sense of loss, but also a sense of provisionality,
i.e., a sense of the ultimate possibility of return to the lost
homeland, alive. The politics of belonging, as well as the
politics of homeland, is therefore as much opportunistic
calculation about power as it is an expression of primor-
dial dimensions of ethnic identity.
However, there is another aspect of the “extreme
ambiguity of place as political guide” that deserves atten-
tion. If belonging is “first and foremost about protection
from violence,” or in other words, if “where you belong
is where you are safe and where you are safe is where you
belong,”8 the forceful disruption of  the physical  link
between a community and its homeland can equally
eliminate the (lost) homeland as a focus of the commu-
nity’s identity in the sense of a desirable place to return.
Rather, successful integration into another safe place can
create a new sense of belonging. At its best, integration
would make belonging irrelevant in the sense that it is
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no longer an issue because protection (and other state services)
can be taken for granted, because cultural diversity, if there is
any, does not matter politically, and because the belonging of
those who lost their homeland is not contested by anyone. In
the face of such a “new homeland” becoming a source of
identification, the wish to return to the lost homeland, if it
continues to exist at all, becomes strictly conditional. One
scenario of possible return would be to extend the achieved
degree of protection to the past homeland through reconquest
and the elimination of any threat by its new inhabitants
(through expulsion, oppression, consociation, etc.). Another
scenario would be a fundamental change of the political con-
ditions in the homeland that would make it safe to return
there. A third scenario is likely in cases where the expulsion of
the community in question has only been partial, that is, parts
of the community have been able to remain in the homeland.
Then it is also possible that the homeland retains its relevance
for individual and collective identities if the expellee commu-
nity can maintain ties with the “homeland community” and
thus with the homeland itself. These scenarios may change
over time and may take any of the above forms, but more
importantly may also manifest themselves in “homeland tour-
ism,” and in initiatives supporting those members of the com-
munity who still live in the homeland as well as in efforts to
preserve the “ethnic character” of the homeland.9 If none of
these scenarios is perceived to be realistic, the lost homeland
will gradually lose its importance as a focus of identity. As this
runs counter to the interests of political entrepreneurs who can
only thrive as “representatives” of an actually existing commu-
nity, they will deploy all their skills and resources to ensure that
at least one scenario continues to be perceived as realistic.
However, even if they fail in doing so, a lost homeland can
retain its identity-forming capacity. Not only will there always
be certain historic memories of the community associated
with it, the actual loss of it, i.e., the event of the forced migra-
tion from the homeland, provides a no-less-powerful source
of identification with, and belonging to, a community of
people that have suffered a similarly traumatic experience.
Political agendas resulting from such a conception of the lost
homeland are likely to include claims for compensation for
material losses and suffering, but equally important claims for
recognition and acknowledgement of such losses and suffer-
ing. Especially when the physical homeland has “lost its attrac-
tion,” symbolic politics of homeland and belonging can be
similarly potent sources of political mobilization, providing
political entrepreneurs with the power base they seek. Yet,
even such more symbolic forms of the politics of homeland
and belonging cannot do without reference to the continued
existence of the homeland, even if it is beyond the grasp and
reach of the community in question. Thus, no matter whether
it is the physical recovery of the homeland or the symbolic
and/or compensatory recognition of its loss, the politics
of belonging always is, at least partly, also the politics of
homeland.
In the context of forced migrations, belonging is the
result of a multitude of complex past and present social
and political processes. It is a multi-dimensional phe-
nomenon rooted in temporal and spatial conceptions of
ethnicity and nationhood, while equally being a product
of political entrepreneurship championing or exploiting
feelings of resentment or entitlement, grief or injustice.
The case of the German expellee organizations is a good
example to demonstrate the significance of the notion of
homeland and its relationship with other dimensions in
the politics of belonging. In order to maintain a sense of
community among the millions of expellees, their most
active political entrepreneurs developed two distinct yet
closely connected meanings of the notion of belonging.
On the one hand, “belonging” came to signify that the
expellees belonged to the (West) German state and cul-
tural nation, establishing a political-legal connection
between them and the society to which they had come,
which entitled them not only to full citizenship rights,
but also to a variety of compensation measures. With
citizenship came voting rights, and with voting rights
came the recognition by politicians that expellees were
an important constituency whose vote made a difference
in local, state, and federal elections, giving the expellee
organizations important leverage over a number of do-
mestic and foreign policy issues, the latter particularly
connected to their former homelands. The other mean-
ing that “belonging” acquired in this specific context is
best described in terms of “ethnic ownership,” i.e., the
belief that the lost homelands of the expellees continue
to belong to them on the basis of historic, ethnic rights.
This insistence on the inalienable right to their home-
land has manifested itself in claims for the possibility of
returning there and for compensation for losses and
suffering. The public debates, or lack thereof, that ad-
dress these issues of belonging have affected the formu-
lation and outcomes of policies over the past
half-century to varying degrees. The notion of belonging
in its various dimensions has been used by the political
representatives of the German expellees to further their
and their constituency’s objectives. Their opportunities
to realize these objectives have been determined by po-
litical dynamics in Germany and Europe on which the
expellee organizations have had only little or no influ-
ence. However, by focusing on domestic issues, as well
as aspects of foreign relations between Germany, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic, I will show that
the political role of these organizations in shaping pre-
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1989 and post-1989 developments in Germany and Europe
must not be underestimated.
Forging and Institutionalizing a New Collective
Identity
The social, economic, and political reconstruction of West
Germany was the major domestic issue in the immediate post-
war period, and the millions of expellees played an important
part in this effort, contributing, in particular, to modernization
and structural changes in underdeveloped and rural areas to
which many of them had been resettled. This proactive integra-
tion signified that the expellees considered themselves as be-
longing to the polity of the emerging West German state. Some
of their leading representatives had quickly risen in the hierar-
chies of the major political parties and played an important role
in shaping specific legislative and policy measures aimed at
expellee integration, such as the 1952 Lastenausgleichsgesetz
(War Burden Redistribution Act) and the 1953 Bundesvertrie-
benengesetz (Federal Expellee and Refugee Law). These meas-
ures reflected the political will to integrate the expellees both
economically and politically, and thus mirrored their percep-
tion of belonging.10 Apart from providing the legal basis for the
social and economic integration of the expellees, the two laws
legally defined the category of an expellee, thus shaping the
notion of belonging to this particular collective in the public
and political spheres in terms of the loss of homeland as a
consequence of expulsion (defined as both deportation and
flight) and in terms of a consequential entitlement to specific
measures of integration and compensation.
The importance for the expellee organizations and their
constituency of realizing this perception of belonging was also
highlighted in the 1950 Charter of the German Expellees, in
which three of the four central demands are about the ex-
pellees’ integration into the West German state.11 By the time
this charter was formulated, the expellees had already over-
come the resistance of the Western Allies to allow them the
creation of their own political and cultural organizations.
From 1949 onwards, these began to develop in a dual struc-
ture. The Central Union of Expelled Germans (Zentralverband
vertriebener Deutscher, or ZvD) was founded in April 1949 and
renamed in 1951 to Union of Expelled Germans (Bund vertrie-
bener Deutscher, or BvD). It focussed its activities on the social
and economic issues of integration. At the party-political level,
this had its equivalent in the Union of Expellees and Disen-
franchised/All-German Union (Bund der Heimatvertriebenen
und Entrechteten/Gesamtdeutscher Bund, or BHE/GB), which
was represented in the German federal parliament, the Bun-
destag, between 1950 and 1957 and was part of the government
between 1953 and 1955. Concerned with the preservation of
the cultural heritage of the expellees, the Union of Eastern
German Regional-Cultural Associations (Verband der ostdeut-
schen Landsmannschaften, or VoL) was founded in Au-
gust 1949 and, after the admission of further regional-
cultural associations from southeastern Europe,
renamed in 1952 to Union of Regional-Cultural Asso-
ciations (Verband der Landsmannschaften, or VdL).
This dual focus of activities reflected not only the key
interests of the majority of expellees, but was also an
expression of an ambiguous sense of belonging. Deriving
from their experience of loss and suffering, the demands
for compensation and integration represented the desire
to belong  to the West  German polity;  that is,  to be
acknowledged and accepted as a member of the political,
social, economic, and territorial community of citizens
of the Federal Republic. In contrast, the wish to preserve
a specific cultural heritage and to maintain as many links
as possible among themselves and with their traditional
homelands had its basis in the particular cultural and
geographic backgrounds that distinguished the expellees
from the indigenous population. It is also evidence of the
preservation of a sense of belonging that is focussed on
the lost homeland both from a territorial and a socio-
cultural perspective.12
Shifting the Focus of Belonging (I): From
Membership to Ownership
Because of the strong commitment of politicians across
all parties, the interests of the western allies, and the
proactive involvement of the expellees themselves, inte-
gration proceeded rapidly and was, for the most part,
concluded by the late 1950s. This meant that one key
feature (the demand for integration) of the expellee iden-
tity ceased to function as a mark of distinction and an
effective source of mobilization. With belonging to the
West German polity no longer contested, the issue van-
ished from the political arena. This was reflected in the
failure of the BHE/GB to overcome the five per cent
threshold in the 1957 federal elections, and in the political
integration of many leading expellee activists into the
major political parties that had already begun much ear-
lier. The loss of this focal point and organizational vehicle
of collective identity further meant that one crucial uni-
fying aspect that had held expellees together despite their
diverse cultural, geographic, and political backgrounds
had disappeared. Consequently, the diversity of ideologi-
cal and cultural traditions within the expellee community
posed an increasing threat of disintegration. Thus, the
notion of belonging had to be reshaped, institutionally as
well as discursively.
The institutional change took place in 1958–59 when
the previous duality of organization was overcome and
the merger of the VdL with the BvD resulted in the
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creation  of  a  new organization, namely  the  Union of Ex-
pellees/United Regional-Cultural Associations and State Or-
ganisations (Bund der Vetriebenen B Vereinigte
Landsmannschaften und Landesverbände, or BdV). This is an
umbrella organization of the various regional-cultural asso-
ciations (twenty-one), the state branches of the BdV (sixteen
since 1990), and its associated organizations (five).13 The BdV
started out primarily as a lobby organization at federal and
state levels. With its increasing political and public marginali-
zation from the late 1960s onwards, it lost much of its influ-
ence and had to redefine its tasks. It expanded into the social
sector, working especially with ethnic Germans migrating to
Germany (the so-called Aussiedler) and, from the mid- to late
1980s onwards, establishing more and more cross-border con-
tacts in the former homelands of the expellees.
Organizational restructuring went hand in hand with the
discursive redefinition of belonging, which was at the same
time the main source for the BdV’s political marginalization.
With the success of integration, the main focus of belonging
switched from membership in the West German polity to the
notion of ethnic ownership of the lost homelands of the ex-
pellees. This notion conceptualizes territory as place rather
than as a tradable commodity and therefore implies that the
entitlement of an ethnic group to live in and shape a specific
territory, which is its place of origin, is independent of political
boundaries and legal titles to property and land. In particular,
the organizations representing the expellees from the Sudeten-
land and from the former eastern territories of the German
Reich have subscribed to this conception of their former
homelands. Increasingly, they became focussed on the only
vaguely defined “right to the homeland.” Simultaneously,
however, they also began to formulate more pronounced
claims for the restitution of property there and compensation
for the suffering incurred as a consequence of the expulsion.
These were not new elements in the rhetoric of the BdV, but
earlier they had been counterbalanced in the BdV’s public
rhetoric by the notion of belonging focussed on integration.
The notion of ethnic ownership became all the more promi-
nent in the message of the BdV the more its implications were
denounced in the political discourse and in the foreign policies
of the Federal Republic after the change in government in
1969. This marked a political watershed in German politics, as
for the first time since the end of the Second World War a
centre-left government came to power. The impact on the
expellee organizations was equally significant. Already the
great coalition between the conservative Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) after
1966 had signalled a change in Germany’s domestic and for-
eign policy with regard to the expellee issue. However, the
period after 1969 saw a full-scale implementation of the new
Ostpolitik (foreign policy towards Central and Eastern
Europe), conceptually devised in the early 1960s by Egon
Bahr on the premise that change in Central and Eastern
Europe could best be affected by Germany through a
policy of rapprochement that would require a recogni-
tion of the territorial status quo and efforts at reconcili-
ation, in particular with Poland and Czechoslovakia.
The treaties with both countries, in 1970 and 1973,
respectively, signalled a paradigm shift in German policy
and were widely denounced in the expellee community
as betraying the legacy of those who were forced out of
their ancestral homelands. From this perspective, be-
longing as the entitlement to equal rights and participa-
tion in the West German polity was not simply no longer
an issue of struggling for integration, it became also, in
a way, undesirable; the BdV leadership did everything to
dissociate itself from this kind of mainstream politics in
Germany that aimed at reconciliation with the countries
in Central and Eastern Europe, including an acknow-
ledgement of the territorial status quo.14
In this context, it was also important that a political
left-right divide over the expellee issue began to emerge
more clearly. Until the late 1960s, expellees were politi-
cally active in all the major political parties and were able
to influence their agendas.15 However, the death in 1966
of Wenzel Jacksch, the former leader of the Sudeten
German Social Democratic Party, deprived the expellees
of one of their most prolific public figures in general and
of their most vocal member of the SPD. Other expellees,
like Herbert Hupka, later a CDU member of the Bun-
destag, were quickly sidelined and left the SPD either to
withdraw from public politics or to join other parties.
The political left in Germany found it increasingly diffi-
cult to come to terms with the issue of the expulsions and
began to marginalize it in its own discourse and more
and more from the public discourse as well. This was
facilitated by the relative success of the integration of the
expellees and the declining importance of the issue for
the general public.  With  the  exception of Bavaria,  a
Sudeten German stronghold to this day, there was elec-
torally little to gain from focussing on the expulsions
after the mid-1960s, and the expellees found fewer and
fewer credible public fora to voice their concerns. Con-
sequently, the predominant tendency from the late
1960s and early 1970s was for them to withdraw to ever
more extreme positions that found little favour even
with the mainstream of the CDU. The long-term conse-
quence of this was that both political and academic work
on the expulsions became associated with right-wing
politics, so that it was almost impossible until the mid-
to late 1980s to find any objective treatment of the issue
from the traditional left in Germany.16
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Inevitably, this led to alienation between the leaders of the
expellee organization and successive German governments
until the early 1990s,17 and it meant that expellee activists
acquired a public reputation for harming and actively seeking
to destroy the reconciliation process with Central and Eastern
Europe.18 It also resulted in a gap between the public discourse
conducted by leading expellee activists and the objectives and
activities of the organization’s membership. The former con-
tinued to insist on the openness of the German-Polish border
question, the need for an institutionalized right to return to
the expellees’ homelands, and their entitlement to the restitu-
tion of property and compensation from the states from which
they were expelled (especially from Poland and Czechoslova-
kia). In contrast, “ordinary” expellees and their children and
grandchildren had, at least since the middle of the 1980s,
become engaged in the establishing of cross-border contacts
with the people living in their former homelands. This in-
cluded various privately funded and organized aid programs
aimed at ethnic Germans who had stayed in their places of
origin as well as at members of other ethnic communities,
including the titular nations of these countries. Despite the
rhetoric of some hardliners, there was, and is, no widespread
desire among expellees and their children and grandchildren to
return to their places of origin and permanently settle there.19
The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe
in 1989–90 offered new and different opportunities for the
politics of belonging. To some extent, history repeated itself as
belonging once again became an issue of membership in the
German nation and of integration for several hundred thou-
sand ethnic Germans, particularly from Poland and Romania,
who migrated to the Federal Republic. For the first time in
many decades, ethnic Germans from the (former) Soviet Un-
ion were also able to emigrate to Germany in large numbers.
More importantly, the leadership of the expellee organizations
saw the dawn of an unprecedented opportunity to pursue a
reinvigorated politics of belonging focussed on the lost home-
land. While it was the policy of the West German government
to achieve the unification of the two German states even at the
price of finally formally abandoning all territorial claims and
guaranteeing the eastern borders of East Germany as those of
the united Germany, activists of the expellee organizations
tried to stage a referendum in Poland under the slogan “Peace
through Free Choice.” Suggesting that there was still a possi-
bility for border changes, this raised completely unrealistic
hopes among many members of the German minority in
Poland, particularly in Upper Silesia where the response to the
signature campaign in support of the referendum had been
strong. Yet, it proved how unrealistic these hopes had been
when Chancellor Kohl declared, at an event celebrating the
fortieth anniversary of the Charter of the German Expellees in
1990, that the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Ger-
many’s eastern frontier was the price that had to be paid
for the reunification of Germany.20 While this did not
stop expellee activists from continuing to pursue their
particular politics of belonging, it forced them to rethink
and adjust their agenda. Yet this was a gradual process.
Even though, for historical reasons, a border question
similar to that between Germany and Poland never ex-
isted in the relationship between the Federal Republic
and Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic, the rhetoric of
expellee activists has, if anything, been more aggressive
on the Sudeten German issue in the early 1990s, de-
manding “unlimited sovereignty” for Sudeten Germans
in their homeland21 and rejecting the “belonging of the
Sudetenland to any Czechoslovak state.”22 Since then,
the rhetoric has changed in its tone, but not necessarily
in its objectives. The newly elected Speaker of the Sude-
ten Germans, Bavarian Parliament President Johann
Böhm, emphasized in his address to the Sudeten Ger-
man Day in 2000 that demands for territorial autonomy
were unlikely to succeed, nor, if successful, could they be
implemented by the Sudeten Germans in a meaningful
way. Yet, he added that personal autonomy23 still was an
appropriate demand, both more likely to succeed and
more useful for the remaining ethnic Germans in the
Czech Republic “as well as for any returnees, no matter
how many or how few these may be.”24
Clearly, the rhetoric and policies of the BdV in the
early 1990s did not strike a positive cord with the Ger-
man or the Czechoslovak and Polish governments.
However, from around 1993 onwards, the political lead-
ership of the expellee organizations adopted more con-
ciliatory policies. The reason for this was partly that the
German federal government had made further funding
of the organizations dependent upon their participation
in a policy of what could be called constructive recon-
ciliation.25 This meant that the expellee organizations
would be included in the government’s various aid pro-
grams to stabilize and improve the living conditions of
ethnic Germans in their homelands,26 and it thus offered
them wider opportunities to reach out to their places of
origin, which was particularly welcomed by rank and file
members,  many of  whom  had done exactly  that for
many years, but  without anything  similar  to the re-
sources available to them now.27 Nevertheless, the rela-
tionship with Poland in particular became more relaxed,
and representatives of the expellee organizations were
received by the Polish Prime Minister and high-ranking
government officials in the mid-1990s.28
Relations with the Czech Republic, in contrast, did
not develop as smoothly. Despite the signing of the
Treaty on Good Neighbourly and Friendly Relations in
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1993, a variety of issues remained unresolved and continued
to complicate bilateral relations. A renewed attempt to over-
come the difficulties was made with the German-Czech Dec-
laration of 1997. Signed after years of negotiations on January
21, 1997, it highlighted that the two governments could only
agree on very little in relation to the two most critical issues:
the role of the Sudeten Germans in the break-up of Czecho-
slovakia in 1938 and their collective victimization and expul-
sion after the end of the Second World War. The German
government accepted the responsibility of Germany in the
developments leading up to the Munich Agreement and the
destruction of Czechoslovakia, expressed its deep sorrow over
the suffering of Czechs during the Nazi occupation of their
country, and acknowledged that it was these two issues that
had prepared the ground for the post-war treatment and
expulsion of members of the German minority in the country.
The Czech government, on the other hand, regretted the
post-war policy vis-à-vis ethnic Germans, which had resulted
in the expulsion of a large section of the German minority and
expropriation of their property. Both governments agreed that
the remaining members of the German minority in the Czech
Republic and the expellees and their descendants would play
an important role in the future relationship of the two coun-
tries and that the support of the German minority in the Czech
Republic was a matter of mutual interest. While many of the
expelled Sudeten Germans and their descendants remained
skeptical about the value of the Declaration,29 it did acknow-
ledge and legitimize certain long-standing aspects of the poli-
tics of belonging pursued by all expellee organizations. The
Declaration recognized not only the fact of the expulsions, it
also implied an acceptance of its injustice and of the victimi-
zation of innocent people. This would become a major issue
in the politics of belonging in the years after 1997 when the
notion of victimhood would regain its post-war prominence
in a different context.
Shifting the Focus of Belonging (II): Reshaping
Victimhood
From the perspective of the German government, the politics
of belonging, as related to expellees and ethnic Germans in
Central and Eastern Europe, still concerned membership and
integration: expellees and their representatives were members
of the political process and could, under certain circumstances,
fulfill a useful role in the process of reconciliation with the
country’s eastern neighbours. Ethnic Germans in these coun-
tries were still considered members of the German cultural
nation, which entitled them to certain benefits, even if these
benefits no longer automatically included the entitlement to
German citizenship. Those who were allowed into the country
needed to be integrated socially, politically, and economically,
just like the expellees after 1945.
In contrast, the expellee organizations pursued a dif-
ferent course of action.30 Their leadership had for years
reconceptualized “belonging” to include a sense of eth-
nic ownership, and sought to capitalize on the opportu-
nities offered by the transition in Central and Eastern
Europe and the ensuing reconciliation process. Thus, the
concept of ethnic ownership became more and more
clearly shaped, and with it the goals that expellee organi-
zations sought to realize through the politics of belong-
ing. These goals are defined by expellee activists as a right
to return (permanently) to their former homelands, and
the entitlement to compensation for their suffering and
to restitution of expropriated property. In realizing this
particular conception of the politics of belonging, the
expellee  organizations have been  presented with un-
precedented opportunities in the past several years that
allowed them to attach their demands to the bandwagon
of mainstream (institutional) politics and win some
“mindshare” in the public discourse. The first of these
opportunities presented itself in the form of the ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo, the second in the form of several
successful class actions in the United States, and threats
thereof, aimed at compensation for forced labour during
the Second World War, and the third in the form of the
European Union enlargement process.
The conflict in Kosovo with its large-scale population
displacements, and subsequent international interven-
tion to reverse them, in more than one way resembled
what many expellees had experienced themselves, but
also symbolized the hopes of some of them, namely, the
international recognition and enforcement of the right
of people not to be expelled from their homeland, or at
least to return to it if an expulsion could not be pre-
vented.  Pictures  from  Kosovo also  brought  home to
many others, in Germany and elsewhere, the horrors of
refugee tracks, sparking a broad public debate on an
issue that had, for the most part, been deliberately ig-
nored in the German media. By comparing, and linking,
their own plight to that of Kosovo Albanians, expellee
organizations managed to align themselves with a politi-
cal strategy that was beyond moral reproach: that of
preventing, or reversing, ethnic cleansing. By supporting
the policy of Germany during the conflict, the expellee
organizations sought to prepare the ground upon which
they then could reopen the debate on their own suffering
more than fifty years earlier. Already in 1995, the ex-
pellee organizations saw their cause recognized at higher
international levels when the then UN High Commis-
sioner on Human Rights, José Ayala Lasso, emphasized
in a speech in the Paulskirche in Frankfurt that the right
not to be expelled from one’s homeland was a funda-
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mental human  right and  noted  that, while the peoples in
Central and Eastern Europe had suffered terribly under Ger-
man occupation during the Second World War and thus had
a legitimate claim to reparations, such claims “must not be
realized through collective victimization on the basis of gen-
eral discrimination and without the thorough investigation of
individual guilt.”31 Even more relevant to the current political
agenda of the leadership of the expellee organizations was a
report of the UN Commission on Human Rights, entitled
Human Rights and Population Transfer. In its Annex II, it
included a Draft Declaration on Population Transfer and the
Implantation of Settlers, which stated in Article 8 that:
“[e]very person has the right to return voluntarily, and in safety
and dignity, to the country of origin and, within it, to the place of
origin or choice. The exercise of the right to return does not
preclude the victim’s right to adequate remedies, including resto-
ration of properties of which they were deprived in connection with
or as a result of population transfers, compensation for any prop-
erty that cannot be restored to them, and any other reparations
provided for in international law.”32
As implied in the Draft Declaration, besides the right to return,
forcibly displaced persons should also be entitled to the resti-
tution of, or compensation for, property lost as a consequence
of their forced displacement. This remains a very sensitive issue,
particularly in German-Czech relations.33 In the eyes of the
Sudeten German Regional-Cultural Association, the compen-
sation of forced labourers during the Second World War, and
also the negotiations between Germany and the representatives
of survivors from Nazi labour camps, provided some of the
expellees who had suffered particular hardship during the ex-
pulsion and/or in labour camps in Czechoslovakia after 1945
with an equally legitimate claim to receive a symbolic gesture
of compensation from the German-Czech Future Fund. Argu-
ing that this would be an important contribution to the recon-
ciliation between Sudeten Germans and Czechs, the Sudeten
German Regional-Cultural Association submitted a bid to the
fund’s executive board, where it was promptly, and with great
publicity, rejected. At the same time, class action had also been
considered as a possible route to realize claims for the compen-
sation of losses resulting from collective expropriation and
where possible for the restitution of properties that had been
confiscated in this process.34 Plans for class action in the US,
initially against insurance companies that profited from the
collective expropriation of the Sudeten Germans, have been
officially supported by the leadership of the Sudeten German
association.35
A number of opportunities on the European stage have also
been exploited by expellee activists, and their success in this
area has boosted the confidence of some of the political leaders
of the expellee organizations. In April 1999, a resolution
was passed by the European Parliament in which its
members called “on the Czech Government, in the same
spirit of reconciliatory statements made by President
Havel, to repeal the surviving laws and decrees from
1945 and 1946, insofar as they concern the expulsion of
individual ethnic groups in the former Czechoslova-
kia.”36 This is a highly sensitive issue not only in Czech-
EU relations, but also in Czech-German relations and
within the political processes in both countries. Interest-
ingly, a key political activist of the Sudeten Germans,
Bernd Posselt, has been a member of the European
Parliament since 1994 and serves on the Committee on
Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights as Vice Chairman, and on
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy as a substitute mem-
ber. Since 1994, he has also been a member of the
cross-party Working Group on Minorities and served as
its chairman in 1996–97. He has been prominently in-
volved in the drafting and passing of this resolution by
the European Parliament. The fact that there was only a
small majority in favour of the resolution in 1999 must
have been interpreted by the Czech government and
parliament as an opportunity to intervene. Thus, the
Czech parliamentarian and member of the Czech Parlia-
ment-European Parliament Mixed Commission Jan Za-
hradil tried to reverse the European Parliament’s
decision but failed after an intervention by Posselt point-
ing to the  autonomy  of the European parliament in
reaching its decisions. In a new attempt to prevent a
similar formulation in the 2000 resolution of the Euro-
pean Parliament on the status of negotiations on the
Czech Republic’s membership application, Zahradil and
his deputy Lastuvka wrote a letter to all 626 members of
the European Parliament, but all they achieved was an
increased interest in the issue of how far the Beneš
Decrees are in fact compatible with EU law and princi-
ples, resulting in a somewhat stronger formulation, stat-
ing that the European Parliament “welcomes the Czech
government’s willingness to scrutinise the laws and de-
crees of the Beneš Government dating from 1945 and
1946 and still on the statute books to ascertain whether
they run counter to the EU law in force and the Copen-
hagen criteria”.37
The first European Parliament resolution was imme-
diately seized upon by a group of members of the Bun-
destag who proposed a motion, co-sponsored by the
CDU/CSU parliamentary party,  in which  the  federal
government was asked “to take appropriate action in the
spirit of the [resolution of the European Parliament] ...
on its own and in collaboration with the other EU mem-
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ber states and the institutions of the EU.”38 A counter-motion
was introduced by the parliamentary parties of SPD and Alli-
ance 90/The Greens in October 1999, in which the Bundestag
was asked to welcome the statement by Chancellor Schroeder
and Czech Minister-President Zeman of March 8, 1999, that
“neither government will re-introduce property issues [into
their bilateral relationship] either today or in the future.”39
This motion received a majority vote both at committee stage
and after a parliamentary debate in June 2000, while that of
the CDU/CSU parliamentarians was rejected.
What is interesting in relation to these debates on restitu-
tion and compensation in general is that the old left-right
dichotomy in the political process in Germany on issues con-
cerning the expulsion of ethnic Germans has been restored.
For a period of about three years from the mid-1990s onwards,
there seemed to be a certain recognition of the fact that the
expulsion had been a human tragedy, and that there had been
an unjust neglect by the German left of the suffering of the
expellees and their contribution to the reconciliation process
with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.40 This cer-
tainly contributed to the fact that issues of and related to the
expulsion have recently regained considerable discursive
power. Yet, with the (attempted) linking of the expulsion of
the Sudeten Germans to the Czech Republic’s EU accession,
the politics of belonging has  also regained  an unexpected
institutional dimension. Even though it is unlikely that the
admission of the Czech Republic to the EU would not proceed
because of the country’s failure to rescind the relevant de-
crees,41 the commitment of the EU to human rights in its
accession policy gives advocates of a re-examination of the
expulsion issue a powerful  platform  from which not only
human rights violations of the Czechoslovak and Polish gov-
ernments at the time could be addressed, but also the way in
which their successors have dealt with the issue. Thus, by
reopening the debate of where exactly the expellees’ homeland
is, the political leadership of the expellee organizations was
able to preserve the degree of ambiguity about the relationship
between homeland and belonging that they require in order
to promote their and their constituents’ interests.
Yet, it has also been recognized that these interests could be
much more effectively pursued if the expellees received
broader public recognition as victims. In order to achieve this,
the leadership of the expellee organizations had to reshape the
notion of victimhood of both victims of Nazi Germany and
victims of the governments established in Central and Eastern
Europe at the end of the Second World War. In doing so,
expellee activists do not aim at denying that groups that have
long been recognized as victims have suffered and, therefore,
have every right to claim compensation. Rather, the objective
is to achieve for their own members the same international
recognition (including from countries like Poland and the
Czech Republic) with all its legal consequences.42 From
the perspective of the BdV, the opportunities to do so
seem better  than ever.43 However,  it  is important to
realize that the notion of victimhood as a central part of
expellee identity is by no means a new element, nor could
it be one given the very real experience of expulsion.
What has changed, catapulting victimhood back to cen-
tre stage in the debate about belonging, is the fact that
the current national and international environments
provide a wealth of opportunities for the expellee organi-
zations to associate their clientele with a group identity
that seemed likely to further their key objectives.
Conclusion: Reckoning with the Past
Belonging is a complex and multi-dimensional notion.
In the case of the German expellees, it has manifested
itself primarily in terms of an ambiguous relationship to
past and present homelands. While the relationship to the
present homeland, expressed in demands for integration
as citizens with equal rights and as members of the Ger-
man cultural nation, has been relatively uncontested, the
relationship to the past homeland has not only divided
the domestic public discourse in Germany, it has also had
significant implications for the Federal Republic’s bilat-
eral relations with Poland and the Czech Republic, and
now also has the potential to affect the dynamics of EU
enlargement.
The reason why the expulsion of the ethnic Germans
more than fifty years ago still gives rise to heated debate
and has a bearing on institutional processes at German
and European levels can not only be seen in the magni-
tude of the expulsions and the suffering they inflicted on
those affected by them. It has also to do with the fact that
this particular aspect of the Second World War and its
consequences has never  been  properly dealt  with by
means of a broad and open public debate in Germany or
Poland or  Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic. More
than thirty years after the advent of the new Ostpolitik,
the political left and right continue to be divided over
this issue, raising the political profile of, and stakes in, a
debate that should essentially be about reconciliation
and forgiveness. Instead, issues that are a matter of hu-
man rights become highly politicized and are presented
in contexts with which they have little or nothing in
common.  In  turn, because  of ideological preconcep-
tions, obvious links and connections between historical
and current events are denied, thus creating double
standards in the application and implementation of ba-
sic human rights. More often than not, radicalization
and alienation inside and outside Germany have been
the result.
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Thus, while belonging is a concept that has, for each indi-
vidual and collective, strong roots in the past and the present,
it also has implications for the future. In the case of the
German expellees, this has led to a complicated duality be-
tween Heimat, their traditional homelands in Central and
Eastern Europe, and Zuhause, their newly found home in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The majority of them have
reconciled themselves with the fact that a return to their
Heimat, in the sense of restoring a permanent homeland for
an ethnically German return-migrant population anywhere in
Central and Eastern Europe, is impossible (and for many of
them also undesirable). Nevertheless, the failure to recognize
the injustice of collective victimization, and in some cases its
deliberate denial, remains a potent source of mobilization. It
also enables political activists to manipulate remotely related
issues and to continue to incite debates on the expulsion and
its consequences, often with no positive results either for the
expellees and their descendents or for the remaining ethnic
Germans in Central and Eastern Europe on behalf of whom
they claim to act. While it is unlikely, and to some extent also
undesirable, to achieve complete closure on an issue as politi-
cally and emotionally loaded as the expulsion of almost four-
teen million people, a modus vivendi should be sought that
would reconcile the ambiguity in the dual conception of be-
longing and allow the  notions of Heimat and Zuhause to
coexist without polarizing or threatening implications for any
of those affected by it.
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Offenheit der sudetendeutschen Frage,” March 24, 2000).
43. One earlier example of an attempt to reshape victimhood exists
in the form of a declaration submitted by the Sudeten Germans
to the UN in January 1978, in which the VI. Federal Assembly of
the Sudeten German Regional-Cultural Association maintains its
claims to the restitution of expropriated property with specific
reference to, among others, UN Resolution 3236 of November 22,
1974, on the rights of the people of Palestine. Cf. United Nations
General Assembly, Resolution 3236 of 22 November 1974 on the
Question of Palestine. (A/RES/3236 (XXIX).
Stefan Wolff is Lecturer in German Studies in the Department of
European Studies, University of Bath, England, UK.
Volume 20 Refuge Number 1

